The Vorgan radio program remained unchanged. UNAVEM said: “The long-standing issue of transforming the UNITA radio station into a two-party broadcasting system is not yet fully resolved. Although agreement has been reached on the name and other details of the station, the issue of spectrum allocation is still under discussion. 2 The military integration process has been linked to planning problems. With regard to the creation of the FAA, as stated in the agreement, little progress has been made. As at 27 September, only 4,000 of the 26,300 UNITA troops planned to be integrated had been selected. The selection teams were present in the camps, but UNITA was unwilly to cooperate with the process2 Representatives of the Southern African Development Community, the Organization for African Unity and the United Nations met in Lusaka and drew up the ceasefire agreement from 21 to 27 June 1999. The defence and foreign ministers of the belligerents then met from 29 June to 7 July to discuss the agreement. [1] The Parties agreed to terminate all military operations within twenty-four hours of the signing of the agreement referred to in Article I(2)(c). Article I prohibited further military movements or the transfer of weapons on the battlefield and urged all nations to respect human rights and protect civilians. Article III released all prisoners of war in Section 8 and gave the International Red Cross the task of assisting the wounded in Section 9. Article 11 called for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. [3] The document also called for the OAU to set up a temporary peacekeeping force to fight militant groups until the UN force arrives.

[2] Mwesiga Laurent Baregu and Chris Landsberg of the International Peace Academy criticized this provision in 2003 and said the OAU was overwhelmed and SADC was better equipped to deal with the charge. [1] In another government response, General Higino Carneiro added greater ambiguity to the amnesty issue by suggesting that the problem was Savimbi`s refusal to limit the required number of UNITA troops agreed in the Lusaka agreement. This indicated a “catch 22” scenario. According to Savimbi, UNITA forces did not yet have an amnesty when they were bombed by government forces. Thus, Savimbi said he must remain mobilized as long as the government pursues UNITA militarily. Meanwhile, General Higino suggested that the violence had continued because UNITA had not been demobilized in accordance with the plan. General Carneiro said: “I think the recent statements by the head of UNITA may lead to different interpretations if we are not able to explain the phases of the Lusaka Protocol, including the captivity of soldiers. For example, we do not understand the fact that UNITA cannot imprison more soldiers than it promised, unless the government makes a gesture of goodwill. . .

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